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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper aims at defining a set of privacy metrics 
(quantitative and qualitative) in the case of the 
relation between a privacy protector ,and an 
information gatherer .The aims with such metrics 
are : -to allow to assess and compare different user 
scenarios and their differences ;for examples of 
scenarios see [4]; -to define a notion of privacy 
boundary, and design it to encompass the set of 
information , behaviours , actions and processes 
which the privacy protector can accept to expose to 
an information gathering under an agreement with 
said party ; everything outside the boundary is not 
acceptable and justifies not entering into the 
agreement ; -to characterize the contribution of 
privacy enhancing technologies (PET). A full case is 
given with the qualitative and quantitative privacy 
metrics determination and envelope, i.e. a Cisco Inc. 
privacy agreement. 
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1. DEFINITIONS 
 
The privacy protector is an individual , group or 
organization defending consciously a set of 
information , behaviours, values , processes and 
methods in terms of the full control and  
independence of these .This set is called the private 
information set. 
 
The information gatherer is an individual, group, 
organization,  machine or network , operating on the 
privacy protector’s information set .However, in 
special cases , the information gatherer may also be 
“nature” that is the privacy protector’s own 
environment . 
 
The information gathering operations may be: 
-either the result of an explicit agreement between 
the two above parties 
-or the result of an implicit agreement between the 
two above parties , as linked to another type of 
agreement between them, such as a social or 
business agreement  
-or may take place without the privacy protector’s 
explicit or implicit acceptance  
 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL AND SET 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
 
 
Because of information networking effects, in real 
situations the privacy protector shares information 
fully or in part with other privacy protectors, each of 
those having different relations to information 
collectors. 
 Likewise, because of information networking 
effects, the information gatherer shares information 
fully or in part with other information gatherers, 
each of which having different relations to the 
privacy protectors. It is assumed that all members of 
the information collector can access and share freely 
and equally the information gathered. 
 
 
Because of organizational or decision hierarchies, a 
given privacy protector may be exposed to 
information gatherers at different levels, and vice 
versa as well, with different nested or linked private 
information sets. 
 
The presentation below about privacy features is 
limited to the relation between one privacy protector 
and one information collector , although the nature 
of each can be very different .Needles to say, this 
relation is assymmetrical , meaning that the privacy 
protector is also sometimes the information gatherer 
, with two flows eventually existing and usually 
quite different . 
 
Each privacy protector has defined a private 
information set, which nevertheless can be accessed 
and can flow freely between its members .This 
private information set is not restricted to static 
information, or dynamic information, but includes 
also process, sequence, tool and method 
information. 
 
The information collector achieves a measure of 
success if it accesses (copy, transfer, delete, 
substitute) an element in the private information set 
of the privacy-collector, or achieves a change in the 
privacy protector’s existence conditions (role, 
identity, risk exposure, etc...) .  
The privacy features listed below are not organized 
by “vulnerabilities”.  
 
For a further formalism about the above, 
information games, as well as information warfare, 
offer useful frameworks. 
 
This paper does NOT however take the approach of 
a cost-benefit analysis or quantitative game between 
the parties driven by their utility functions. 
 
 
3. PRIVACY FEATURES 
 
3.1. Copy feature 
 
This feature exists in two instances: 
-“Copy-quantitative” :how much information in the 
private information set is copied and available to the 
information collector ;if several information 
quantity measures exist, this feature exists for each 
-“Copy-qualitative”: what is the relative value, on a 
value scale ,of the private information copied and 
available to the information collector ; if several 
information value measures exist , this feature exists 
for each . 
 
Besides, the feature can be assessed by either the 
privacy protector or the information collector; if 
there is a gap, there may be loss or a third party 
involved.  
 
The different information types apply to a wide 
range of moral, capability, information asset, and 
other types. 
 
3.2. Transfer, delete, and substitute 
features: 
 
They are defined as in 3. 1. ,except that the copy 
process is replaced by the transfer , delete, substitute 
processes to the benefit of the information collector 
.If there is transfer, the information does not exist 
any more in the private information set. 
 
3.3. Role change feature 
 
This qualitative feature “Role-qualitative” indicates 
on a scale, how different the privacy protector’s role 
in his previous context, has changed as a result of 
the information collection .Normally the scale go 
from vastly diminished contributing role in this 
context, to vastly enhanced .From the networking 
point of view it can be approximated by the number 
of links of influence or benefit this privacy protector 
gets as a result of the information collection. 
 
3.4. Identity change feature 
 
This qualitative feature ”Identity-qualitative” 
indicates on a scale if the information collection has 
destroyed or enhanced the visibility and 
independence of the privacy collector in his 
previous context as  a result of the information 
collection ; this includes personal preferences, 
lifestyle, values being disclosed 
 
3.5. Time feature 
 
This quantitative feature “Time-quantitative” states 
the relative loss or gain of time of the privacy 
protector in his main time-dependent actions and 
their success, due to the information collection 
taking place  
 
3.6. Risk feature 
 
This quantitative feature “Risk-quantitative” states 
the rate of reduction or increase of the privacy 
protector in his main risk exposed actions and their 
success, due to the information collection taking 
place 
 
3.7. Leaking feature 
 
This quantitative feature “Leak-quantitative” defines 
the perceived probability, seen from the privacy 
protector, which if there is information collection, 
the information gathered will be copied to a third 
party due to the information collector’s networking 
facilities. 
 
 
4. PRIVACY ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This term encompasses the set and process based 
protocols (in an information theoretic sense) 
whereby the privacy features are tracked and later 
negotiated .In quite many cases , the information 
collector will grant the privacy protector some rights 
,services or goods , against his agreeing to 
disclosing some of the information in the private 
information set ,plus some other compensation . In 
many cases such a negotiation will operate on 
Min(Max) or Max(Min) values with a 
corresponding value logic, which works both on 
qualitative as well as quantitative values. 
 
Privacy assurance is then the set of processes and 
physical measures taken by a privacy protector to 
safeguard his private information set. 
 
5. PRIVACY FEATURE VALUE 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
The assumption made here is that privacy is a 
mental perception for which there exists 
distributions of the extreme values , akin hazard and 
risk assessment about technical systems .Extremes 
of privacy features are perceived , from a human 
perception point of view, as stress ,for which 
bayesian priors may exist .The idea is to estimate 
the probability that the privacy holder is strong 
enough to overcome the information collection 
stress .These distributions are also assumed to exist 
over finite ranges ,although the end points may not 
be defined or reproducible .It is also assumed that 
the ranges have a sufficient granularity to allow for 
qualitative or quantitative values to be assessed over 
these ranges. 
 
We do not make here any explicit assumptions such 
as the fuzzy set membership  functions used by 
some approaches to risk and security using fuzzy 
sets ,and the resulting possibility expected values 
Likewise we do not specify or assume any structure 
in the privacy feature hierarchy, such as the tree 
based views in safety analysis (and fault trees)  ; the 
reason for this last assumption is that the different 
privacy feature do not in general exhibit between 
them causal relations which can be formalized in 
this structured way .We do not either use formal 
approaches to information semantics which could 
eventually encapsulate privacy protector 
understandings ,as this is very difficult to 
characterize  without proper knowledge 
representation and knowledge acquisition [5]. 
 
We do acknowledge that privacy features in 
different user scenario may be analyzed by Monte 
Carlo simulation about the whole usage or 
information collection simulation. 
 
Thus, we conjecture here that the distribution of the 
extreme values of the privacy features each obey as 
a first approximation a probability distribution akin 
many extremes [1,2,6 ] ,that is f(x) measures the 
probability that the random feature value X is larger 
than x : 
 
f (x) =1- k * exp ( -a *exp(b*x)) 
 
where a , b , k are normalized  constants ,and an 
order relation for x values exist which give low 
ranks to values favourable to the privacy protector, 
and high values to those who are not .If order is 
reverse, formula changes. The constants are 
normalized so that f(x) is a true probability 
distribution function, that is: 
 
f(0) or f(low) =1 
f(infinite) or f(max) = 0 
 
where “low” and “max” are end values of 
qualitative ranges. 
 
The above approximation is essentially non-
parametric as it does not assume parametric or 
specific distributions of the feature values .Some 
more complex wavelet based models exist which 
require the estimation of more parameters, which 
may be difficult to do in the context of this study. 
If enough data can be collected , the stress-strength 
models for reliability with non-parametric inference 
from a learning sequence , can give confidence 
bounds on the privacy features [3]; of course more 
precise estimates can be obtained if a prior 
distribution is assumed (Weibull, Poisson) and one 
can also utilize the eventual covariances between 
different privacy features (if known) .  
 
Some prior research [7] has taken an information 
theoretical approach to the same issue of defining 
metrics on anonimity, but suffers from the need of 
prior distributions of information sets for both the 
privacy protector and the information gatherer.  
 
6. PRIVACY ENVELOPE 
 
We define now the privacy envelope as the set of 
states of the privacy protector (and his privacy 
assurance processes), which: 
-either are inside tolerable values for the privacy 
protector, set explicitely for each feature by a 
privacy feature threshold value; 
-or, correspond to one given probability p for all 
privacy feature values x to be less than the 
distribution of the extremes, such that  p=f(x); in 
this case p becomes a privacy tolerance measure 
across all features.  
 
7. COMPUTATION AN ANALYSIS 
CASE  
 
Appendix gives a full case with the full text of the 
terms of a service level agreement (SLA)  , for a 
Privacy agreement proposed by Cisco to individuals 
seeking access to a Cisco Web site (see Figure 1) 
.The Appendix gives as well as an initial qualitative 
grading by the PrivacyHolder of the privacy 
attributes of this SLA. In this Section we give a full 
computation of the privacy envelope following the 
methodology and formulas of the previous Sections 
.We also determine quantitatively privacy 
equilibrium of the privacy features. Whereas the 
qualitative grading showed that the initial 
assessment of the Cisco SLA was actually quite 
unfavourable for the PrivacyHolder, the 
computation determines a better and more objective 
equilibrium, thus reflecting PrivacyHolder’s 
“privacy risk aversion” .The graphical presentation 
of the privacy envelope offers a visual way to show 
how privacy metrics cluster in favourable or 
unfavourable subsets to either party. 
 
7.1. InformationGatherer (Cisco)  
 
The InformationGatherer Cisco has three 
component demand functions for the service they 
supply commercially to third parties; the service 
relies on information inputs from PrivacyHolders. In 
general the demand is increasing with the quality of 
the information Cisco collects from the 
PrivacyHolders: 
-demand grows exponentially, with a ceiling, vs. 
copied information quantity from PrivacyHolder 
-demand decreases exponentially, with a floor, vs. 
role enhancement, visibility and support given to 
PrivacyHolder 
-demand grows exponentially, with a ceiling, vs. 
leakage Cisco can make to third parties (includes 
Cisco’s customers) 
Cisco’s utility function is a linear weighted sum of 
the above demand functions, and is to be 
maximized. It is assumed that the pricing is fixed 
and common for all customers of Cisco, thus 
revenue is proportional to supplied demand. 
 7.2. PrivacyHolder 
 
PrivacyHolder is in this case not a commercial 
entity but owns know how and information assets, 
plus an identity and social role. For reasons of 
simplification, all PrivacyHolders are assumed to 
behave identically. 
 
The PrivacyHolder’s information asset reserves are 
tapped by copy, delete, and substitute functions 
enabled under an SLA with Cisco, but are also 
accrued over time by the role enhancement of the 
PrivacyHolder which the SLA enables. 
 
The information asset reserves of PrivacyHolder are 
a weighted linear combination of the past reserves, 
accrued (with the right signs) for transfer, delete , 
substitution and future role driven enhancements 
.The copy function does not deplete these assets .In 
the weights the  maximum capacities allowed under 
the SLA are taken into account. 
 
The utility for PrivacyHolder of his entering into an 
agreement  with Cisco is proportionate to his 
information assets (which can be supplied in total or 
usually in parts) ,multiplied by  the privacy utility of 
this supply , as measured by the privacy metrics 
distribution taken from the point of view of the 
PrivacyHolder  (see Section 5 ) .However, as the 
PrivacyHolder is not acting for revenue 
maximisation but for privacy protection ,the privacy 
utility of this supply across all privacy metrics 
should be the largest (or eventually the median ) ,but 
certainly not the smallest . 
 
PrivacyHolder’s utility function does not include in 
this case a price based component as the supply is 
on a free voluntary basis. 
 
7.3. Privacy equilibrium 
 
The determination or computation of the final 
equilibrium SLA driven privacy attribute values 
should result from a fair equilibrium between 
Cisco’s utility function, and PrivacyHolder’s utility 
function. The equilibrium should be computed 
across all privacy metric variables set by the 
PrivacyHolder (in this case: 13 see Table 1) .All 
these variables are to be determined within the 
bounds (upper and lower) on each attribute. 
For lack of access to a MaxMin computation 
software with constraints, is computed here the 
minimum of the squared difference between the 
utility function values of Cisco and of the 
PrivacyHolder, subject to the set constraints on all 
privacy metric attribute values. 
 
7.4. Privacy envelope 
 
For each set of privacy attributes , is computed and 
visualized in a radial “star” form the computed 
thirteen privacy metrics using the formula in Section 
5 (Figure 2)  .The formula’s parameters are however 
estimated and adjusted for computability. 
 
 
Figure 1: SLA and usage of information gathered 
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Figure 2: Privacy envelope (Cisco case) 
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8. CONCLUSION, CRITICISM 
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
The formalism above assumes all privacy metrics to 
be calibrated or defined in terms of prior values or 
probabilities corresponding to an operating context 
preceding the information collector’s operations 
.This makes indeed absolute comparisons almost 
impossible, although the privacy envelopes 
determined by the same perceived p values may 
allow for comparison.  
On the other hand, most humans and organizations 
do perceive stress in terms of reference frameworks 
which are subjective. Consequently, any case must 
specify the initial assumptions made. 
 
The privacy ranges, and envelope, are of huge 
importance when implementing service level 
agreements (SLA’s, defined in the Open Group’s 
SLA Handbook) between the privacy protector and 
the information collector .This envelope, the 
thresholds, or the probability p, may be used in the 
SLA attributes to be negotiated. The economic 
impact of these privacy features has been researched 
in a companion report in the PRIME project which 
implements privacy SLA’s with economic contract 
values. 
Finally , this paper recognizes that privacy SLA’s 
business value does not extend to all domains, while 
conversely there are application domains where 
their introduction would be a major incentive 
scheme to unleash controlled information and 
business interactions . To difficult areas belong 
health privacy (see e.g. EU IS/T project PRIDEH-
GEN)  ,and some security information. To the 
realistic areas belong telecommunications and 
mobile services, transport , information services , 
and logistics ; some calculation cases and even 
implementations are underway in some of these last 
areas . 
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APPENDIX : A CASE : CISCO’s 
PRIVACY POLICY  
 
This is  an illustration of the values a privacy 
protector exposed to this “privacy policy” could set , 
facing the information collection process by Cisco 
which this protector may have agreed to if he has 
agreed upon the terms of this service level 
agreement (SLA)(Tables 1 and 2) .The text of the 
Cisco policy is reproduced below ((C) Cisco Inc) 
(Table 3) 
 
In the qualitative attribute range, “Average”/”Same”  
stands for the conditions existing prior to entering 
into an agreement .In the quantitative attribute 
range, values depend on individual’s client 
configuration . 
 
The distributions of extremes is not reported here  
,although it can easily be derived  from the privacy 
feature values (and range specifications ) below- A 
simple colour coding approximation has been done, 
that is : 
-orange:if privacy feature value is at threshold for 
privacy protector  
-green : ””””””””””””””””””””” is better than 
threshold “”””””””””” 
-red : “”””””””””””””””””””””” exceeds threshold 
“””””””””””””””” 
It can be seen that ,by and large, and yet to be 
confirmed by a single aggregate probability of 
reaching extreme, the relationship between the 
privacy protector and the information collector 
formalized by the agreement underneath, is not 
favourable to privacy protector . 
 
Table 1 : INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS AND 
PRIOR’s 
 
CONTEXT PRIVACY 
PROTECTOR 
INFORMATION 
GATHERER 
Identity Individual in 
his work 
environment 
and for his 
learning 
Cisco 
Explicit 
agreement 
Individual 
releases some 
basic 
information on 
identity,roles, 
responsibilities  
information 
needs, IT 
system, use of 
Cisco systems , 
against promise 
by Cisco to 
send a 
newsletter and 
give access to a 
Cisco product 
site via a 
login/password 
Cisco collects 
information about 
individual and his 
professional 
needs and 
environment, as 
well as about the 
Web traffic 
generated by 
individual 
Implicit 
agreement 
Cisco may have 
an agreement 
with 
individual’s 
employer or IT 
systems 
platform 
operator 
Cisco has 
agreements with 
unnamed third 
parties 
Non 
authorized 
agreement 
N/A N/A 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Privacy feature ranges , thresholds and values for Case (Privacy protector’s view)  
 
PRIVACY 
FEATURE 
RANGE/UNITS ORDER 
(Increased 
risk/Diminishing 
risk)  
VALUE THRESHOLD VALUE vs. 
THRESHOLD 
 
Copy-
quantitative 
0-100 MB I 10 k 30 k  
Copy-
qualitative 
Useless-Minor-Average-
Critical(individual)-
Business critical( 
employer) 
I Critical 
(individual) 
Average (no 
anonymous 
browsing 
possible) 
 
Transfer-
quantitative 
0-100 MB I 0 0  
Transfer-
qualitative 
Useless-Minor-Average-
Major-Business 
critical(individual)-
I Major , due to 
unspecified 
nature of cookies 
Average  
Business critical( 
employer) 
and attached 
trojan horses, and 
unspecified use 
of log files 
Delete-
quantitative 
0-100 MB I 0 0  
Delete-
qualitative 
Useless-Minor-Average-
Major-Business 
critical(individual)-
Business critical( 
employer) 
I Average Average  
Substitute-
quantitative 
0-100 MB I 10 MB 
downloadable 
information files 
or executable 
files; no 
protection against 
disruptions 
0  
Substitute-
qualitative 
Useless-Minor-Average-
Major-Business 
critical(individual)-
Business critical( 
employer) 
I Business 
critical(employer) 
Average  
Role change Much reduced-Reduced-
Same-Enhanced-Much 
enhanced/new role 
D Same as 
individual’s 
contributions are 
not recognized by 
Cisco  
Enhanced   
Identity change Destroyed-reduced-Same-
Enhanced-Significantly 
strengthened  
D Reduced, as 
personal usage 
and preferences 
are disclosed and 
logged ,to access 
any self-selected 
information 
Same  
Time  Blocked-Reduced-Same-
Enhanced-Competitive 
advantage 
D Enhanced, due to 
timely access to 
information 
maybe not 
available 
otherwise 
Enhanced  
Risk Significantly larger-
Larger-Same-Reduced-
Significantly less 
D Reduced Reduced  
Leakage Reduced-Same-Increased-
Major leakage 
I Increased , due to 
Cisco controlled 
transfer to 
partners and 
others ,as well as 
unspecified data 
Same  
content of 
cookies 
 
 
 
 
Privacy Statement 
 
 
  
 
Table  3 : CITATION (C) Cisco Inc  
Cisco Systems, Inc. Online Privacy Statement 
Cisco respects your privacy and is committed to protect the 
personal information that you share with us. Generally, you 
can browse through our website without giving us any 
information about yourself. When we do need your personal 
information to provide services that you request or when you 
choose to provide us with your personal information, this 
policy describes how we collect and use your personal 
information. 
Information Collection 
Personal information means any information that may be used 
to identify an individual, including, but not limited to, a first 
and last name, email address, a home, postal or other physical 
address, other contact information, title, birth date, gender, 
occupation, industry, personal interests, and other information 
when needed to provide a service you requested. 
When you browse our website, you do so anonymously, 
unless you have previously indicated that you wish Cisco to 
remember your login and password. We don't automatically 
collect personal information, including your email address. 
We do log your IP address (the Internet address of your 
computer) to give us an idea of which part of our website you 
visit and how long you spend there. But we do not link your 
IP address to any personal information unless you have logged 
in to our website. Like many other commercial websites, the 
Cisco website may use a standard technology called a 
"cookie" to collect information about how you use the site. 
Please go to "Cookies and Tracking Information" below for 
more information. 
Cisco collects personal information when you register with 
Cisco for a Cisco account, when you use certain Cisco 
products or services, when you register to attend a seminar or 
participate in an online survey, when you ask to be included in 
an email or other mailing list, or you submit an entry for a 
sweepstakes or other promotions, or when you submit your 
A cookie is a small data file that certain Web sites write to 
your hard drive when you visit them. A cookie file can contain 
information such as a user ID that the site uses to track the 
pages you've visited, but the only personal information a 
cookie can contain is information you supply yourself. A 
cookie can't read data off your hard disk or read cookie files 
created by other sites. Some parts of Cisco's website use 
cookies to track user traffic patterns. We do this in order to 
determine the usefulness of our website information to our 
users and to see how effective our navigational structure is in 
helping users reach that information. 
If you prefer not to receive cookies while browsing our 
website, you can set your browser to warn you before 
accepting cookies and refuse the cookie when your browser 
alerts you to its presence. You can also refuse all cookies by 
turning them off in your browser, although you may not be 
able to take full advantage of Cisco's website if you do so. In 
particular, you may be required to accept cookies in order to 
complete certain actions on our website. You do not need to 
have cookies turned on, however, to use/navigate through 
many parts of our website, except access to certain of Cisco's 
web pages may require a login and password. 
How We Use Information Collected 
Cisco uses information for several general purposes: to fulfill 
your requests for certain products and services, to personalize 
your experience on our website, to keep you up to date on the 
latest product announcements, software updates, special offers 
or other information we think you'd like to hear about either 
from us or from our business partners, and to better 
understand your needs and provide you with better services. 
We may also use your information to send you, or to have our 
business partners send you, direct marketing information or 
contact you for market research. 
Information Sharing and Disclosure 
Because Cisco is a global company, your personal information 
may be shared with other Cisco offices or subsidiaries around 
the world. All such entities are governed by this Privacy 
Policy or are bound by the appropriate confidentiality and data 
transfer agreements. 
Your personal information is never shared outside Cisco 
without your permission, except under conditions explained 
below. Inside Cisco, data is stored in controlled servers with 
limited access. Your information may be stored and processed 
in the United States or any other country where Cisco, its 
subsidiaries, affiliates or agents are located. 
Cisco may send your personal information to other companies 
or people under any of the following circumstances: when we 
have your consent to share the information; we need to share 
your information to provide the product or service you have 
requested; we need to send the information to companies who 
work on behalf of Cisco to provide a product or service to you 
(we will only provide those companies the information they 
need to deliver the service, and they are prohibited from using 
that information for any other purpose); or we want to keep 
you up to date on the latest product announcements, software 
updates, special offers or other information we think you'd 
like to hear about either from us or from our business partners 
(unless you have opted out of these types of communications). 
We will also disclose your personal information if required to 
do so by law, to enforce our Terms of Use, or in urgent 
circumstances, to protect personal safety, the public or our 
websites. 
Your Ability to Review and Delete Your Account and 
Information 
If you are a registered CCO user, you can review your 
personal information by accessing 
http://tools.cisco.com/RPF/profile/profile_management.do. 
You may also request deletion of your Cisco account or any of 
your personal information held by us by sending an email to 
privacy@cisco.com. 
Data Security 
Your Cisco account information is password-protected for 
your privacy and security. Cisco safeguards the security of the 
data you send us with physical, electronic, and managerial 
procedures. In certain areas of our websites, Cisco uses 
industry-standard SSL-encryption to enhance the security of 
data transmissions. While we strive to protect your personal 
information, we cannot ensure the security of the information 
y u transmit to us, and so we urge you to take every 
precaution to protect your personal data when you are on the 
Internet. Change your passwords often, use a combination of 
le ters and numbers, and make sure you use a secure browser. 
Children and Privacy 
Our websites do not target and are not intended to attract 
children under the age of 13. Cisco does not knowingly solicit 
personal information from children under the age of 13 or 
send them requests for personal information. 
Third Party Sites 
Cisco's website contains links to other sites. Cisco does not 
share your personal information with those websites and is not 
responsible for their privacy practices. We encourage you to 
learn about the privacy policies of those companies. 
Our website may contain links to websites operated by other 
companies. Some of these third-party sites may be co-branded 
with a Cisco logo, even though they are not operated or 
maintained by Cisco. Although we choose our business 
partners carefully, Cisco is not responsible for the privacy 
practices of web sites operated by third parties that are linked 
to our site. Once you have left our website, you should check 
the applicable privacy policy of the third party website to 
determine how they will handle any information they collect 
from you. 
Changes to this Privacy Policy 
Cisco will amend this policy from time to time. If we make 
any substantial changes in the way we use your personal 
information we will make that information available by 
posting a notice on this site. 
Questions or Suggestions 
If you have questions or concerns about our collection, use, or 
disclosure of your personal information, please email us at 
privacy@cisco.com. 
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